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Death and the Partnership Principle: Interpreting Recent
Abatement Amendments to North Carolina's Equitable
Distribution Act
North Carolina equitable distribution laws reflect public policy
that strongly favors the partnership principle of marriage.' Consistent
with this important principle, the North Carolina General Assembly
has sought to encourage couples seeking divorce to play active roles2
in reaching equitable property settlements outside the courtroom.
The North Carolina General Assembly, through numerous revisions
of the Equitable Distribution Act ("Act"), 3 has tried to preserve the
1. The partnership principle presumes that both spouses contribute equally to the
marital unit and are thus entitled to an equal share of marital property upon dissolution of
the marriage. Sally Burnett Sharp, The PartnershipIdeak The Development of Equitable
Distributionin North Carolina,65 N.C. L. REV. 195, 198-99 (1987). For further discussion
of this concept, see generally Susan Westerberg Prager, Sharing Principlesand the Future
of Marital Property Law, 25 UCLA L. REv. 1 (1977) (claiming that sharing principles
function in marriages and marriage-like relationships, and therefore states should
recognize these common expectations of sharing at the dissolution of the marriage). See,
e.g., Act of Aug. 10, 2001, ch. 364, § 1, 2001 N.C. Sess. Laws 146, 146 (to be codified at
N.C. GEN. STAT. § 50-20(c)) (making an equal division of property upon the dissolution of
marriage mandatory unless "an equal division is not equitable," and then requiring an
equitable distribution); White v. White, 312 N.C. 770, 775, 324 S.E.2d 829, 832 (1985)
(asserting that the process of equitable distribution "reflects the idea that marriage is a
partnership enterprise to which both spouses make vital contributions"); Khajanchi v.
Khajanchi, 140 N.C. App. 552, 556, 537 S.E.2d 845, 848 (2000) (noting that the enactment
of North Carolina's equitable distribution laws was "grounded in the notion that marriage
is a partnership enterprise"); Friend-Novorska v. Novorska, 131 N.C. App. 508, 510, 507
S.E.2d 900, 902 (1998) (citing the language in White, 312 N.C. at 775, 324 S.E.2d at 832);
see also Sally Burnett Sharp, Equitable Distribution of Property in North Carolina: A
PreliminaryAnalysis, 61 N.C. L. REV. 247, 247 (1983) (noting that equitable distribution
affords special recognition to "the invaluable role played by a homemaker spouse").
2. Section 50-20(d) permits a couple, during or after marriage, to contract for an
equitable distribution of property. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 50-20(d) (1999). North Carolina
favors these private property settlements because they are assumed to be a satisfactory
arrangement reached by parties on equal footing. See Hagler v. Hagler, 319 N.C. 287,290,
354 S.E.2d 228, 232 (1987); Hill v. Hill, 94 N.C. App. 474, 480-81, 380 S.E.2d 540, 545
(1989); Knight v. Knight, 76 N.C. App. 395, 398, 333 S.E.2d 331, 333 (1985). But see Sally
Burnett Sharp, Fairness Standardsand SeparationAgreements: A Word of Caution on
ContractualFreedom, 132 U. PA. L. REV. 1399, 1406 (1984) (arguing that spouses may not
have equal bargaining power in these kinds of contracts because they are negotiated under
highly stressful conditions and the context of the "dissolution of marriage... deviates
substantially from the competitive, arm's length bargaining between strangers in which
standard bargaining principles were designed to operate").
3. See Act of July 3, 1981, ch. 815, 1981 N.C. Sess. Laws 1184 (current version at ch.
364, §§ 1, 2,2001 N.C. Sess. Laws 146, 146) (to be codified at N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 50-20 to
-21). Sections 50-20 and 50-21 deal with property distribution upon divorce and are
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integrity of the partnership theory. In further support of the principle
that marriage is an economic partnership, the General Assembly
enacted "An Act to Clarify That an Action for Equitable Distribution
Does Not Abate Upon the Death of a Party"4 on August 10, 2001.
These statutory amendments specify that when a married couple
separates and files an action for equitable distribution of marital and
divisible property, and then one spouse dies prior to the entry of an
equitable distribution order, the decedent's death does not abate the
pending equitable distribution action 5 But the amendments do not
specify whether a surviving spouse or decedent spouse's estate may
initiate an equitable distribution action subsequent to the parties'
separation and the decedent's death.6
Because a party's death does not presumptively dismiss a cause
of action, 7 the General Assembly's failure to comment on such
posthumous equitable distribution actions could promote decisions
that run counter to the partnership principle and discourage parties
from attempting to settle property disputes through private
agreement. Although a strict textual reading of the amendments
suggests that equitable distribution claims must be filed prior to a
party's death to survive, such an interpretation ignores the important
public policy underlying the partnership principle of marriage. This
Recent Development argues that courts should interpret the new
abatement amendments to recognize that the death of a spouse
following separation, but before the filing of an equitable distribution
claim, does not destroy the right of either the surviving spouse or the
decedent spouse's estate to seek an equitable distribution of property.
Statutory language, precedent, and sound public policy support such
an interpretation.

commonly referred to as the "Equitable Distribution Act." See Sally Burnett Sharp, Step
by Step: The Development of the DistributiveConsequences of Divorce in North Carolina,
76 N.C. L. REV. 2017,2019 n.2 (1998) [hereinafter Sharp, Distributive Consequences].
4. Act of Aug. 10,2001, ch. 364,2001 N.C. Sess. Laws 146, 146-49 (to be codified at
N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 50-20, -21, 30-3.2, -3.3, 29-14). Sections 30-3.2 and 30-3.3 deal with a
surviving spouse's right to claim an elective share, and section 29-14 governs intestate
succession.
5. Act of Aug. 10,2001, ch. 364, § 2,2001 N.C. Sess. Laws 146, 146 (to be codified at
N.C. GEN. STAT. § 50-20).
6. See id.
7. See N.C. GEN. STAT. § lA-1, Rule 25(a) (1999) ("No action abates by reason of
the death of a party if the cause of action survives."); § 28A-18-1(b)(3) (1999) (stating that
a cause of action in favor of a decedent does not survive "where the relief sought could not
be enjoyed, or granting it would be nugatory after death").
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The General Assembly passed the Equitable Distribution Acte in

1981 to combat the inequities present in the "common-law title"
system of property division. 9 Since its enactment, the Act has been
subject to critical amendments that more clearly reflect these fairness
principles. 10 Originally, the Act provided that a judgment for
equitable distribution could not be entered before the entry of a
divorce decree.
Between 1981 and 1992, the General Assembly
amended the Act three times to add exceptions to this rule. 2 It

amended another provision in 1987 to change the time when
equitable distribution rights vest from the time of filing for divorce to
the time of separation. 3 This amendment supports the inference that

the General Assembly intended to allow equitable distribution
actions to proceed independent of the outcome of divorce actions."4
Yet some courts continued to hold that an equitable distribution
judgment must follow a divorce decree.' 5 Then in 1995, the General

8. §§ 50-20,-21.
9. 2 SUZANNE REYNOLDS & KENNETH M. CRAIG, NORTH CAROLINA FAMILY
LAW § 169.3, at 4 (4th ed. Special Supp. on Equitable Distribution 2000). See generally id.
§ 169.3, at 1-8 (explaining the common law system and citing several cases acknowledged
as driving forces in the development of the Equitable Distribution Act); Sharp, supra note
1, at 195-201 (discussing how the introduction of no-fault divorce also helped pressure the
legislature into passing the Equitable Distribution Act and expounding on the partnership
ideal behind the Act). When a party seeks an equitable distribution of marital property,
the Act requires the court to determine a distribution that reflects each party's
contribution to the family, which can take the form of earned income or homemaking
services. Hagler v. Hagler, 319 N.C. 287, 289, 354 S.E.2d 228, 232 (1987). For a
description of what constitutes marital property, see N.C. GEN. STAT. § 50-20(b) (1999).
This Recent
10. Sharp, Distributive Consequences, supra note 3, at 2024.
Development focuses on the amendments that affect the procedure for filing an equitable
distribution action and the termination of that right.
11. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 50-21(a) (1981) (current version at ch. 364, § 1, 2001 N.C. Sess.
Laws 146, 146) (to be codified at § 50-21(a)) [hereinafter Equitable Distribution
Procedures Provision]; see, e.g., Brown v. Brown, 136 N.C. App. 331, 332-33, 524 S.E.2d
89,91 (2000), rev'd,353 N.C. 220,539 S.E.2d 621 (2000).
12. For a comparison of the original and amended Equitable Distribution Procedures
Provision, see sections 50-21 (1989), 50-21 (1991), 50-21 (1992), and 50-21 (1995); see also
Brown, 136 N.C. App. at 333, 524 S.E.2d at 91 (comparing the various versions of the
provision).
13. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 50-20(k) (1987) (current version at § 50-20(k) (1999)); see
Brown, 136 N.C. App. at 333,524 S.E.2d at 91 (discussing the amendment to § 50-20(k)); 2
REYNOLDS & CRAIG, supra note 9, § 169.6, at 25.
14. See Brown, 136 N.C. App. at 333,524 S.E.2d at 91.
15. See, e.g., Trogdon v. Trogdon, 97 N.C. App. 330, 330, 388 S.E.2d 212, 212 (1990)
(holding that an equitable distribution order cannot be obtained when death abates a
divorce action); Caldwell v. Caldwell, 93 N.C. App. 740, 742, 379 S.E.2d 271, 272 (1989)
(explaining that the action for divorce and equitable distribution abated when the plaintiff
died).
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Assembly deleted entirely the text that referred to the "equitable
distribution after divorce" rule and its exceptions. 6
Despite these amendments, some courts remained uncertain as
to whether the General Assembly intended to allow an equitable17
distribution action to ensue independent of any divorce proceeding.
Because a party's death clearly abates a divorce action, 8 this
confusion became especially significant in cases where a party died
after separation but prior to the entry of an equitable distribution
judgment or a divorce decree. Confronted with this ambiguity, the
North Carolina Supreme Court decided Brown v. Brown.19
In Brown, the administrator of a wife's estate asked to proceed
as the plaintiff in the wife's equitable distribution action.2 0 Reversing
the court of appeals, the court held that "when death ends all chance
for divorce, any equitable distribution action then pending must
abate."' That is, an equitable distribution action could only proceed
16. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 50-21(a) (1995), repealedby Act of June 14, 1995, ch. 245, 1995
N.C. Sess. Laws 510 (current version at ch. 364, § 1, 2001 N.C. Sess. Laws 146, 146) (to be
codified at N.C. GEN. STAT. § 50-21(a)). In 1992, section 50-21(a) authorized a court to
enter an equitable distribution judgment prior to the entry of a divorce decree only
through a consent judgment, when an incompetent spouse was involved, or when the
parties had been separated for six months and agreed in writing to an equitable
distribution of property as determined by the court. § 50-21(a) (1992), amended by Act of
Oct. 1, 1993, ch. 209, 1993 Sess. Laws 389 (current version at ch. 364, § 1, 2001 N.C. Sess.
Laws 146, 146) (to be codified at N.C. GEN. STAT. § 50-21(a)). After the 1995
amendment, the section read: "At any time after a husband and wife begin to live
separate and apart from each other, a claim for equitable distribution may be filed, either
as a separate civil action, or together with any other action brought pursuant to Chapter 50
....
" § 50-21 (1995), amended by Act of Aug. 10, 2001, ch. 364, § 1, 2001 N.C. Sess. Laws
146, 146 (to be codified at N.C. GEN. STAT. § 50-21(a)); see also Brown, 136 N.C. App. at
333, 524 S.E.2d at 91 (discussing the legislative history of the Equitable Distribution
Procedures Provision).
17. Compare Brown, 136 N.C. App. at 334, 524 S.E.2d at 92 (determining that the
parties' right to equitable distribution at separation cannot be divested, whether or not the
parties divorce) with Brown v. Brown, 353 N.C. 220, 227, 539 S.E.2d 621, 625 (2000)
(concluding that an equitable distribution right is linked to divorce proceedings despite
amendments to the Equitable Distribution Procedures Provision).
18. See, e.g., Elmore v. Elmore, 67 N.C. App. 661, 664, 313 S.E.2d 904, 906-07 (1984)
(noting that because an action for divorce is based on the status of the marriage, a court
cannot enter a divorce decree where the marriage is dissolved by death).
19. 353 N.C. 220,539 S.E.2d 621 (2000).
20. Id. at 222, 539 S.E.2d at 622. The wife had died shortly after filing her complaint
but before the court had entered an equitable distribution judgment or divorce decree. Id.
21. Id. at 224, 539 S.E.2d at 624. The court examined the title of the 1995 amendment
to the Equitable Distribution Procedures Provision: "An Act to Allow Claims for
Equitable Distribution to Be Resolved Either Before or After an Absolute Divorce Is
Granted ...... Act of June 14, 1995, ch. 245, 1995 N.C. Sess. Laws 510. The court then
concluded that the amendment did not remove the link between equitable distribution and
divorce, but merely authorized an equitable distribution action to occur prior to the entry
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if the possibility of obtaining a divorce decree existed.22 This
conclusion leads to a striking inconsistency. A couple that separates
but decides not to divorce can still receive an equitable property
distribution because the "possibility" of divorce continues to exist.
But if death removes a couple's ability to obtain a divorce, both the
decedent's heirs and the survivor lose their rights to equitable
distribution regardless of whether both parties intended to divorce.
Thus, under the Brown holding, a surviving spouse would be
eligible to inherit a deceased spouse's property only because the
parties technically remained married. In such situations, the surviving
spouse could take property under one of four methods: testate
succession,2 intestate succession, 24 elective share, or life interest
election. 6 Providing for property distribution through any one of

of a divorce decree. Brown, 353 N.C. at 223,225,539 S.E.2d at 623,625. The court did not
address prior cases that held that the death of a party did not abate an action for the
adjudication of property rights. See, e.g., Elmore, 67 N.C. App. at 667, 313 S.E.2d at 908
(holding that a divorce action must abate upon the plaintiff's death because he "did not
seek an adjudication of property rights"); see also 1 ROBERT E. LEE, NORTH CAROLINA
FAMILY LAW § 48, at 253 (4th ed. 1979) (noting that a party's death only terminates an
action for divorce but does not necessarily prevent that portion of the action that seeks an
adjudication of property rights). The Brown court cited Elmore, but only referred to its
general holding that the death of a party abates a divorce action. Brown, 353 N.C. at 222,
539 S.E.2d at 622-23.
22. Brown, 353 N.C. at 223,539 S.E.2d at 623.
23. Under this method, the surviving spouse inherits according to the terms of the
decedent's will. See generally N.C. GEN. STAT. ch. 31 (1999 & Supp. 2000) (detailing the
requirements for a valid will).
24. See Act of Aug. 10, 2001, ch. 364, § 6, 2001 N.C. Sess. Laws 146, 149 (to be
codified at N.C. GEN. STAT. § 29-14) (discussing the distribution of property upon
intestacy). The surviving spouse's share in the property of an intestate spouse depends on
the value of the property and whether lineal descendants or a parent also survived the
decedent. Id.
25. See N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 30-3.1, -3.4 (1999); ch. 364, §§ 4, 5, 2001 N.C. Sess. Laws
146, 146-48 (to be codified at §§ 30-3.2, -3.3) (defining formulas and procedures for
determining an elective share). As in intestate succession, the surviving spouse's share
depends in part on the number of the decedent's lineal descendants and is based on a
percentage of the decedent spouse's net estate (probate assets). Id. Elective share is a
surviving spouse's right to dissent from a deceased spouse's will and instead take a
statutorily determined percentage of the assets of the estate. Tracy Dawn Cobb,
Comment, North Carolina'sNew Elective Share Statute: Much Ado About Nothing?, 36
WAKE FOREST L. REv. 795, 798 (2001). Elective share is intended to protect a surviving
spouse against disinheritance. Id. at 798-99. For further discussion of North Carolina's
elective share statutes, see generally Cobb, supra.
26. See N.C. GEN. STAT. § 29-30 (1999) (providing that a surviving spouse may elect
to take a life estate in certain real and personal property of the decedent spouse in lieu of
an elective share or intestate share). This right is also known as statutory dower because it
closely resembles common law dower.
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these methods when the parties have already separated may yield
results that run contrary to the partnership model of marriage 7
On one hand, the surviving spouse may be undercompensated
when he or she takes under one of the above-mentioned methods.
For example, even if the decedent spouse died testate, the decedent

may have removed the surviving spouse from the will in
contemplation of divorce." The only means then left for the
surviving spouse to receive property are the statutory rights to take

an elective share or to take a life interest election. Neither of these
systems effectively treats the surviving spouse as an equal partner.29

For example, these statutes fail to consider the mismanagement of
marital assets during marriage or a period of separation.3 0 The
Equitable Distribution Act, however, does allow a court to consider
any party's waste, neglect, or conversion of marital property during
separation, 31 as well as "other factor[s] ' '32 the court considers to be
proper, which may include the mismanagement of marital property
during the marriage.3 3
27. See K. Edward Greene, A Spouse's Right to Control Assets During Marriage: Is
North Carolina Living in the Middle Ages?, 18 CAMPBELL L. REv. 203, 211-12 (1996)
(explaining that a surviving spouse may receive an inequitable property distribution if the
decedent spouse transferred substantial property through inter vivos conveyances). Note
that the testate and intestate statutes embody the partnership principle in so far as they
seek to prevent a spouse from disinheriting the surviving spouse. Id. at 211. For more
support of the assertion that North Carolina's equitable distribution laws embody the
partnership principle, see supra note 1.
28. See, e.g., Evans v. Evans, 514 S.E.2d 74, 75 (Ga. Ct. App. 1999) (noting that a
decedent spouse had filed for divorce and excluded surviving spouse from his will); In re
Estate of Zimmerman, 561 N.W.2d 642, 643 (N.D. 1997) (quoting decedent spouse's will
as stating, "I am presently married and separated, contemplating divorce. I hereby leave
my wife the legal minimum required by law," and holding that the surviving spouse's
elective share must be considered to determine what she may receive under the will).
29. See § 29-30; 88 30-3.1, -3.4; ch. 364, §§ 4,5,2001 N.C. Sess. Laws 146, 147-49 (to be
codified at §§ 30-3.2, -3.3). Though these systems were enacted with the intention of
furthering the partnership principle, their end results may fail to effectuate that policy.
Cobb, supra note 25, at 799-800. For instance, a surviving spouse may be disinherited by
the non-probate lifetime transfers loophole, or may take a windfall. Id. at 801, 805. For
example, a surviving wife might receive few assets if her decedent husband chose another
individual as the beneficiary of his life insurance policy, a non-probate asset. Also, if a
surviving spouse is a successive spouse, it is possible that he or she may only take one-half
of what he or she would have taken if the decedent had died intestate. Id. at 806-07.
30. Greene, supra note 27, at 211.
31. Act of Aug. 10, 2001, ch. 364, § 3,2001 N.C. Sess. Laws 146, 146-47 (to be codified
at N.C. GEN. STAT. § 50-20(c)(11a)).
32. N.C. GEN. STAT.

§ 50-20(c)(12)

(1999).

33. See, e.g., DiOrio v. DiOrio, 751 A.2d 747,750 (R.I. 2000) (finding it reasonable for
the trial judge to consider the husband's refusal to rent out a vacation home with the
potential for high rental income in determining equitable distribution). The surviving
spouse also may be barred from acquiring any rights to a distribution of property if the
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On the other hand, the surviving spouse may receive a windfall,
either through inheritance by a will that devises all property to the
surviving spouse, by succeeding to property held as tenants by the
entirety,34 or through a life interest election when the decedent's
estate contains a large amount of real property 5 In all likelihood,
under the Brown holding, either the surviving spouse or the decedent
spouse's heirs or devisees would receive a distribution of property
that does not reflect North Carolina's partnership-based theory of
marriage. 6 Faced with this inconsistency, the General Assembly took
action.
The Act of August 10, 2001,.1 revised five different statutes with
six amendments. An amendment to section 50-21(a) 38 severs
equitable distribution claims from divorce proceedings and permits an
equitable distribution claim to "be filed and adjudicated" following a
separation. 9 The most important amendment adds a new statutory
section that states, "[a] pending action for equitable distribution shall
spouse engaged in certain acts. See N.C. GEN. STAT. § 31A-1 (Supp. 2000). Under this
statute, a surviving spouse loses the rights of intestate succession, elective share, and life
interest election (among others) if the spouse commits adultery or abandons the decedent
spouse. Id.
34. When divorce destroys a tenancy by the entirety, the former spouses become
tenants in common. See, e.g., Sawyer v. Sawyer, 54 N.C. App. 141,143,282 S.E.2d 527,528
(1981) (describing how death and divorce affect tenancies by the entirety). But if death
destroys the tenancy instead, the surviving spouse continues to own the property in full.
See, e.g., id.
35. A surviving spouse probably would not take a life interest election unless the
decedent spouse was "seised" of a large amount of real estate because the statute
generally provides for a life estate "in one third in value of all the [decedent's] real estate."
N.C. GEN. STAT. § 29-30(a) (1999).
36. See, e.g., Evans v. Evans, 514 S.E.2d 74, 75 (Ga. Ct. App. 1999) (excluding the
surviving spouse from the decedent spouse's will following separation); Fazekas v.
Fazekas, 737 A.2d 1262, 1265 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1999) (holding that a wife was entitled to all
the funds held in an escrow account as a tenant by the entirety, when her husband died
following separation but before the entry of a divorce). But note that property
settlements are binding and survive a party's death. See, e.g., Riley v. Riley, 86 N.C. App.
636, 638, 359 S.E.2d 252, 253 (1987) (holding that a husband's death before his divorce was
finalized did not nullify a property agreement he made with his wife). "[P]roperty
acquired by the single enterprise of the marital unit, to which both spouses often are
presumed to contribute equally, should be equally shared when the unit is dissolved .... "
Sharp, supra note 1, at 199; see also Smith v. Smith, 314 N.C. 80, 86, 331 S.E.2d 682, 686
(1985) (explaining that the "heart of the theory" of the partnership principle is the idea
that both spouses equally contribute to "the economic circumstances of a marriage")
(citations omitted).
37. Act of Aug. 10,2001, ch. 364,2001 N.C. Sess. Laws 146, 146-49 (to be codified at
N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 50-20 to -21, 30-3.2 to -3.3,29-14).
38. § 50-21(a), amended by Act of Aug. 10, 2001, ch. 364, § 1, 2001 N.C. Sess. Laws
146, 146 (to be codified at § 50-21(a)).
39. Act of Aug. 10, 2001, ch. 364. § 1, 2001 N.C. Sess. Laws 146,146 (emphasis added).
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not abate upon the death of a party." 4 These amendments are
intended to limit the risk of undercompensating either party.
The remaining amendments seek to prevent the possibility of
overcompensation when a surviving spouse acquires both an
equitable distribution of property and a share of the decedent's estate
through operation of intestate or testate succession41 The General
Assembly eliminated the possibility of such a predicament by
amending the Equitable Distribution Act and several of the
provisions governing intestate succession and elective share rights.
First, by adding a factor under section 50-20(c), 42 the General
Assembly now requires courts to consider any property passing to the
surviving spouse through a will, intestacy, a tenancy by the entirety, a
beneficiary designation, or an elective share in determining how to
distribute property equitably.4 3 Second, the General Assembly
included property passing to a surviving spouse through the new
equitable distribution laws in the formulas for determining a surviving
spouse's elective share or intestate succession share.4 Thus, the
40. An Act to Clarify That an Action for Equitable Distribution Does Not Abate
Upon the Death of a Party, ch. 364, § 2, 2001 N.C. Sess. Laws 146, 146 (to be codified at
N.C. GEN. STAT. § 50-20(1)). This amendment (and the source of the title of the Act) was
presumably designed to clarify emphatically the confusion resulting from Brown. See id.
41. Brown v. Brown, 136 N.C. App. 331, 339, 524 S.E.2d 89, 94-95 (2000) (Lewis, J.,
dissenting) (describing this situation as a "practical dilemma"), rev'd, 353 N.C. 220, 539
S.E.2d 621 (2000).
42. Act of Aug. 10, 2001, ch. 364, § 3,2001 N.C. Sess. Laws 146, 146-47 (to be codified
at § 50-20(c)(11b)). Section 50-20(c) previously listed thirteen factors for courts to
consider in determining an equitable distribution of property. Sharp, supra note 1, at 245.
The amendment added that courts should consider the following:
a. Property passing to the surviving spouse by will or through intestacy due to
the death of a spouse.
b. Property held as tenants by the entirety or as joint tenants with rights of
survivorship passing to the surviving spouse due to the death of a spouse.
c. Property passing to the surviving spouse from life insurance, individual
retirement accounts, pension or profit-sharing plans, any private or governmental
retirement plan or annuity of which the decedent controlled the designation of
beneficiary (excluding any benefits under the federal social security system), or
any other retirement accounts or contracts, due to the death of a spouse.
d. The surviving spouse's right to claim an "elective share" pursuant to G.S. 303.1 through G.S. 30-33, unless otherwise waived.
Act of Aug. 10, 2001, ch. 364, § 3, 2001 N.C. Sess. Laws 146, 146 (to be codified at § 5020(c)(llb)).
43. See Act of Aug. 10, 2001, ch. 364, § 3, 2001 N.C. Sess. Laws 146, 146-47 (to be
codified at § 50-20(c)(llb)).
44. See Act of Aug. 10, 2001, ch. 364, §§ 4-6, 2001 N.C. Sess. Laws 146, 147-49 (to be
codified at N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 30-3.2(d), 30-3.3(a), 29-14(c)). The amendments to
sections 30-3.2(d) and 30-3.3(a) instruct that the value of the marital estate that passes to
the surviving spouse through equitable distribution shall be included under "Property
Passing to Surviving Spouse," and that the property that will pass must be included under
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amendments to the Equitable Distribution Act and to the intestacy
and surviving spouse statutes aim to preclude the overcompensation
of a surviving spouse entitled to a division of property both through
equitable distribution and through inheritance laws.
These legislative enactments evince an intent to promote the
partnership principle by allowing an equitable distribution action to
proceed when a party dies prior to the entry of an equitable
distribution order. The courts should interpret the amendments to
preserve the right of a surviving spouse or decedent spouse's estate to
initiate an equitable distribution action when the death occurred
between separation and the filing of an equitable distribution action.
Reviewing North Carolina's general abatement statutes together with
the language of the amendments in light of public policy favoring the
partnership principle demonstrates that such an interpretation is
consistent with the General Assembly's intent.
A party's death only abates an action when the death removes
the cause of action.4 5 If the cause of action survives, then the court
may substitute the decedent's personal representative for the
decedent and allow the action to continue. 46 Therefore, with the
amendment to section 50-20,4 the General Assembly arguably
asserted that a cause of action survives when a party dies before a
pending equitable distribution action can be resolved. Although the
Act states that it intends to "clarify" that death does not abate a
previously initiated equitable distribution action, it is silent with

the decedent's "Total Net Assets" for elective share purposes. Id. §§ 4-5. The
amendment to section 29-14(c) instructs that the share of the surviving spouse determined
under intestate succession laws "shall be first determined as though no property had been
awarded to the surviving spouse pursuant to [the Equitable Distribution Procedures
Provision] subsequent to the death of the decedent, and then reduced by the net value of
the marital estate awarded to the surviving spouse." Id. at § 6. Prior to these
amendments, no provision covered this situation.
45. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 1A-1, Rule 25 (1999). Note that an "action" is a judicial
proceeding and is synonymous with the term "suit." BLACK'S LAW DICIONARY 28-29
(7th ed. 1999). A "cause of action" consists of the facts that give rise to a basis for filing a
suit. Id at 214.
46. See § 1A-1, Rule 25. Note that some earlier cases held that an action did not abate
when even incidental property rights were involved. See, e.g., Patrick v. Patrick, 245 N.C.
195, 199, 95 S.E.2d 585, 588 (1956) (noting that a husband had a right to proceed with an
action to vacate a divorce decree in order to establish property rights notwithstanding the
fact that his wife had died); Poole v. Poole, 210 N.C. 536, 539, 187 S.E. 777, 779 (1936)
(determining that a wife's action to vacate a divorce decree did not abate upon her
husband's death because property rights were involved).
47. "A pending action for equitable distribution shall not abate upon the death of a
party." Act of Aug. 10, 2001, ch. 364, § 2,2001 N.C. Sess. Laws 146, 146 (to be codified at
§ 50-20(1)).
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respect to whether an equitable distribution cause of action expires
unless filed prior to a party's death.'
Because the equitable
distribution cause of action survives for both the surviving spouse and
the decedent's estate, both parties should have an opportunity to take
advantage of it.4 9 This outcome would likely follow the intent of the
decedent spouse who had initiated an equitable distribution action
prior to her death. Similarly, even if the decedent spouse had not yet
filed an equitable distribution action, his separation provides strong
evidence that the decedent would prefer his other heirs or devisees to
take his equitable portion of the marital property, rather than his
surviving spouse. After all, if the parties in the latter situation are not
permitted to file an equitable distribution action, they face the
possibility of an inequitable division of property-the exact policy
problem that the amendments were designed to cure. 0
In addition to examining the effect of abatement, determining
the correct method for interpreting the amendments also requires a
contextual evaluation of their passage. 1 To be sure, the title of the
Act of August 10, 2001 only refers to equitable distribution actions."
But amended section 50-21(a) permits the filing of an equitable
distribution action and the actual property distribution order at any
time after the parties' separation.5 3 The fact that the amendment

48. An Act to Clarify That an Action for Equitable Distribution Does Not Abate
Upon the Death of a Party. Act of Aug. 10, 2001, ch. 364,2001 N.C. Sess. Laws 146,146.
49. The statutory scheme provides an exception to the general rule that all rights of
action in favor of a decedent survive for situations when a cause of action would be
nugatory after death, such as a cause of action for divorce. See N.C. GEN. STAT. § 28A-181(b)(3) (1999); Elmore v. Elmore, 67 N.C. App. 661, 664, 313 S.E.2d 904, 906 (1984)
(explaining that a claim for divorce does not survive the death of a party).
50. See N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 29-30, 30-3.1, -3.4 (1999); Act of Aug. 10, 2001, ch. 364,
2001 N.C. Sess. Laws 146, 146-49 (to be codified at N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 29-14, 30-3.2 to
-3.3); see also supra notes 22-35 and accompanying text (discussing inequities under the
common law system).
51. See, e.g., Brown v. Brown, 353 N.C. 220, 223, 539 S.E.2d 621, 623 (2000) ("Courts
may refer to the context of an act to infer legislative intent when the meaning of a statute
is in doubt.").
52. An Act to Clarify That an Action for Equitable Distribution Does Not Abate
Upon the Death of a Party. Act of Aug. 10, 2001, ch. 364, §§ 1-6, 2001 N.C. Sess. Laws
146, 146-49 (to be codified at N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 50-20, -21, 30-3.2, -3.3, 29-14). But note
that courts have concluded that the title of an act " 'will not be permitted to control when
the meaning of the text is clear.'" In re Appeal of Forsyth County, 285 N.C. 64, 71, 203
S.E.2d 51, 55 (1974) (quoting Dunn v. Dunn, 199 N.C. 535, 536, 155 S.E. 165, 166 (1930));
see also Allen v. Allen, 76 N.C. App. 504, 506, 333 S.E.2d 530, 532 (1985) (asserting that
while a statute's title may be considered, the statute's language controls when legislative
intent is clearly expressed in the language).
53. Act of Aug. 10, 2001, § 1, 2001 N.C. Sess. Laws 146, 146 (to be codified at N.C.
GEN. STAT. § 50-21(a)).
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specifically allows for the entry of an equitable distribution judgment

after separation, without any mention of the necessity for a
corresponding divorce action,' 4 indicates that a party's death should
not prevent the filing of an equitable distribution complaint, so long
as the parties separated prior to the decedent's death.

This

interpretation comports with the language of section 50-20(k), which
emphasizes that the parties' equitable distribution rights vest at the
time of the parties' separation5 But commentators have often noted

that the Equitable Distribution Act created only an optional remedy
'56
for separated spouses and not "a new form of property ownership.
As Judge Lewis argued in dissent in Brown, section 50-20(k) "does

not create any vested rights in particular property, but merely creates
a right to equitable distribution of the property."57 Thus, perhaps if
the spouses fail to file for an equitable distribution of property in time
(for example, before the death of a party), they simply lose their
rights to enjoy that system of property division.
If parties lose their equitable distribution rights by not asserting
them quickly enough, then the Equitable Distribution Act would
seem to favor parties who immediately file equitable distribution
actions over those who wait and attempt to settle property disputes
through private agreements. This interpretation of the Act would
54. "At any time after a husband and wife begin to live separate and apart from each
other, a claim for equitable distribution may be filed and adjudicated. . . ." Id.
55. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 50-20(k) (1999); see also 2 REYNOLDS & CRAIG, supra note 9,
§ 169.13, at 225. The authors of this supplement contend that the language of section 5020(k) supports an argument that "the death of a spouse after separation but before the
assertion of a right to an equitable distribution of property should not divest the surviving
spouse's right to an equitable distribution of marital and divisible property." Id. The
word "parties'" should be substituted for the term "surviving spouse's" here as the
decedent spouse's estate has the same right to equitable distribution as the surviving
spouse.
56. 2 REYNOLDS & CRAIG, supra note 9, § 169.3, at 4. Without an equitable
distribution of property, "a spouse does not, by virtue of marriage, acquire an interest in
property titled in the name of the other spouse." 2 id.; see also Hagler v. Hagler, 319 N.C.
287, 290, 354 S.E.2d 228, 232 (1987) (noting that "in the absence of an equitable
distribution under [section] 50-20, the state of the title of property owned by either spouse
or by both spouses is unaffected").
57. Brown v. Brown, 136 N.C. App. 331, 338-89, 524 S.E.2d 89, 94 (2000) (Lewis, J.,
dissenting), rev'd,353 N.C. 220,553 S.E.2d 621 (2000).
58. A property settlement is "an agreement that adjusts the rights of the couple in real
and personal property." Sally Burnett Sharp, Divorce and the Third Party: Spousal
Support, Private Agreements, and the State, 59 N.C. L. REV. 819, 826 (1981); see also
Anderson v. Anderson, 145 N.C. App. 453, 457, 550 S.E.2d 266, 269 (2001) (discussing
how separation agreements allow a couple to determine a division of property for
themselves in lieu of a court ordered equitable distribution).
A separation agreement "is a contract between spouses providing for marital
support rights." Katherine Martin Allen, Property Settlement or Separation Agreement:
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certainly encourage parties with illnesses to file an equitable
distribution complaint immediately. But it runs counter to the
accepted public policy notion that property settlements, a type of
private agreement, "are favored in this state, as they serve the
salutary purpose of enabling marital partners to come to a mutually
acceptable settlement of their financial affairs. '5 9 In fact, the
Equitable Distribution Act specifically authorizes a married couple,
through a valid writing, to reach a binding property agreement
deemed to be equitable by both parties. ° So long as the parties
consider the settlement to be fair, the property settlement bars the
use of the Equitable Distribution Act.6 ' If the parties achieve a
settlement, the Act is no longer necessary to ensure that either party
acquires an adequate distribution of property. 62 Instead, a property
settlement allows spouses to determine a property division together,63
thus upholding the principle that marriage is a partnership. Although
Perpetuatingthe Confusion-Buffington v. Buffington, 63 N.C. L. REV. 1166, 1169 (1984).
Although a legal distinction exists between property settlements and separation
agreements, many parties enter into an agreement that covers both property division and
support payments and (along with the courts) refer to the entire document as a separation
agreement. Id. at 1170. For a discussion of the problems associated with interchanging
these terms, see generally Stegall v. Stegall, 100 N.C. App. 398, 402-04, 397 S.E.2d 306,
309-10 (1990) (analyzing the "construction and effect" of a separation agreement); Allen,
supra at 1170.
59. Hagler,319 N.C. at 290,354 S.E.2d at 232; see also Hill v. Hill, 94 N.C. App. 474,
480-81, 380 S.E.2d 540, 545 (1989) (discussing why North Carolina courts favor property
settlements); Allen, supra note 58, at 1173 (discussing the various principles, with which
North Carolina courts comply, that reflect a policy in favor of private property
settlements).
60. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 50-20(d) (1999).
61. See id. (stating that a valid separation agreement determined by the parties to be
equitable is binding on the parties); Blount v. Blount, 72 N.C. App. 193, 195, 323 S.E.2d
738,740 (1984) (asserting that an action seeking an equitable distribution of property must
be dismissed when the parties' settlement agreement fully disposed of property rights);
see, e.g., Hagler,319 N.C. at 292,354 S.E.2d at 233 (stating that equitable distribution is an
alternative to creating a property settlement); Peter M. Jennings, Note, Contractual
Agreements As a Means of Avoiding EquitableDistribution-Buffingtonv. Buffington, 21
WAKE FOREST L. REv. 213, 213 (1985) ("Parties may avoid equitable distribution with a
well-drafted contract.").
62. See Hagler, 319 N.C. at 293, 354 S.E.2d at 233 (noting that the existence of a
property settlement demonstrates that the parties intended to determine the appropriate
property division for themselves).
63. Allen, supra note 58, at 1173. Allen argues, however, that barring equitable
distribution by the court when the parties have entered into a property settlement
"ignores the potential for overreaching and unfairness in marital contracts negotiated
wholly outside the courtroom" and that "[a]t some point, North Carolina courts must
consider whether contract remedies alone provide sufficient protection." Id. at 1175. But
as Professor Sharp notes, the parties may prefer the freedom to prepare a property
settlement that allows them to "divide property in a fashion that a court would be without
power to order." Sharp, PrivateAgreements, supra note 58, at 826 n.38.
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North Carolina courts have not yet articulated exactly when a
property settlement deemed equitable by the parties is too objectively
unfair to be upheld, 64 they will grant relief "if the settlement is
manifestly unfair to a spouse because of the other's overreaching."'65
If courts interpret the recent amendments to the Equitable
Distribution Act as preventing a surviving spouse or decedent
spouse's estate from initiating an equitable distribution action when
the decedent spouse died, they might discourage separated couples
from first attempting to resolve property disputes privately and by
mutual agreement. 66 Although a party could file an equitable
distribution action and then pursue a private property settlement
while the action is pending, this option would waste both the parties'
and the courts' time and money. A better solution is to interpret the
recent amendments in a manner that encourages the parties to first
seek a property settlement, while assuring them that an equitable
distribution action will remain available as a viable alternative.67
The General Assembly's recent enactment to clarify that an
equitable distribution action does not abate upon the death of a party
is yet another attempt to eliminate inequities and promote the
partnership marriage principle. But the Act's passage leaves open the
question of whether the abatement amendments also preserve the
right to initiate an equitable distribution action following separation
and the death of a party. Reasonable statutory interpretation and
sound public policy dictate that courts should resolve this issue in
favor of posthumous equitable distribution initiations. Such an
interpretation upholds the partnership principle while still
encouraging parties to seek property settlements through private
agreements.68
ELIZABETH P. MILLER

64. LLOYD T. KELSO, NORTH
CUSTODY § 4-5, at 51 (4thed. 2001).

CAROLINA DIVORCE, ALIMONY AND

CHILD

65. Stegall v. Stegall, 100 N.C. App. 398, 401, 397 S.E.2d 306, 307 (1990) (quoting
Johnson v. Johnson, 67 N.C. App. 250,255,313 S.E.2d 162,165 (1984)).
66. A couple may prepare a property settlement at any time during the marriage. See
N.C. GEN. STAT. § 50-20(d) (1999). But "it is a common practice for the parties to enter
into an agreement determining the rights of the parties to their marital and separate
property" following their breakup. Jennings, supranote 61, at 217.
67. This is true at least until a divorce decree is entered. If the parties have not filed
for equitable distribution before a court enters a divorce decree, the parties may no longer

assert that right. See N.C. GEN. STAT. § 50-11(e) (1999).
68. "[The greater the uncertainty in the law, the more likely it is that disputes will be
litigated instead of settled." Sharp, DistributiveConsequences,supra note 3, at 2025.
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